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Link Failure Detection in Multi-hop Control Networks
Alessandro D’Innocenzo, Maria Domenica Di Benedetto and Emmanuele Serra
Abstract— A Multi-hop Control Network (MCN) consists of
a plant where the communication between sensors, actuators
and computational unit is supported by a wireless multi-hop
communication network, and data flow is performed using
scheduling and routing of sensing and actuation data. We
characterize the problem of detecting the failure of links of the
radio connectivity graph and provide necessary and sufficient
conditions on the plant dynamics and on the communication
protocol. We also provide a methodology to explicitly design the
network topology, scheduling and routing of a communication
protocol in order to satisfy the above conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networked control systems are spatially dis-
tributed control systems where the communication between
sensors, actuators, and computational units is supported by a
shared wireless communication network. Control with wire-
less technologies typically involves multiple communication
hops for conveying information from sensors to the controller
and from the controller to actuators. The use of wireless
networked control systems in industrial automation results
in flexible architectures and generally reduces installation,
debugging, diagnostic and maintenance costs with respect
to wired networks. The main motivation for studying such
systems is the emerging use of wireless technologies in
control systems (see e.g., [1], [2], and [3]).
Although Multi-hop Control Networks (MCNs) offer
many advantages, their use for control is a challenge when
one has to take into account the joint dynamics of the plant
and of the communication protocol. Wide deployment of
wireless industrial automation requires substantial progress
in wireless transmission, networking and control, in order to
provide formal models and verification/design methodologies
for wireless networked control system. The design of the
control system has to consider the presence of the network,
as it represents the interconnection between the plant and
the controller, and thus affects the dynamical behavior of
the system. The analysis of stability, performance, and relia-
bility of real implementations of wireless networked control
systems requires addressing issues such as scheduling and
routing using real communication protocols.
Recently, a huge effort has been made in scientific research
on Networked Control Systems (NCSs), see [4], [5], [6], [7],
and [8], and references therein for a general overview.
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However, the literature on NCSs usually does not take
into account the non–idealities introduced by scheduling
and routing communication protocols of Multi-hop Control
Networks. In [9], a simulative environment of computer
nodes and communication networks interacting with the
continuous-time dynamics of the real world is presented. To
the best of our knowledge, the only formal model of a Multi-
hop Control Network has been presented in [10], [11], where
the modeling and stability verification problem has been
addressed for a MIMO LTI plant embedded in a MCN, when
the controller is already designed. A mathematical frame-
work has been proposed, that allows modeling the MAC
layer (communication scheduling) and the Network layer
(routing) of the recently developed wireless industrial control
protocols, such as WirelessHART (www.hartcomm2.org)
and ISA-100 (www.isa.org).
Consider the networked control architecture illustrated in
Figure 1, that consists of a plant P interconnected to a con-
troller C via two multi-hop wireless communication networks
GR and GO . We proved in [12] that for any time-invariant
topology i of GR and GO , characterized by at least one path
between the controller and the plant, it is always possible
to design a controller Ci, a routing and a scheduling to
arbitrarily assign the eigenvalues of the closed loop system.
Consider the following two application scenarios. In the first
scenario (e.g. the mine application investigated in [13]), an
industrial plant is connected to a controller via a multi-hop
wireless communication network: the graph topology of the
wireless network is time-varying because of link failures and
battery discharge of the communication nodes. In the second
scenario, a plant is connected to a controller via a swarm
of mobile agents (e.g. robots [14] or UAVs [15]) equipped
with wireless communication nodes: the graph topology of
the wireless network is time-varying because of motion of
the agents. In both scenarios, the time-varying topology
perturbs the dynamics of the interconnected system N , and
the controller is required to detect the current topology i of
GR and GO to apply the corresponding control law Ci.
In this paper we suppose that the topology of GR and
GO is time-varying because of link failures, and provide a
methodology to detect the set of faulty links using Fault
Detection and Identification (FDI) methods. In the taxonomy
of fault diagnosis techniques, we leverage on the model-
based approach introduced by the pioneering works in [16],
[17] on observer-based FDI, later pursued in [18] for linear
systems and in [19] for non-linear systems.
As can be inferred from the recent survey [20], fault
tolerant control and fault diagnosis is one of the main issues
addressed in the research on NCSs. However, most of the
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Fig. 1. Proposed control scheme of a MCN.
existing literature on NCSs fault diagnosis (e.g. [21], [15])
usually addresses communication delays, and does not con-
sider the effect of the communication protocol introduced
by a Multi-hop Control Network. In [22], a procedure to
minimize the number and cost of additional sensors, required
to solve the FDI problem for structured systems, is presented.
In [23], the design of an intrusion detection system is
presented for a MCN, where the network itself acts as
the controller. Our modeling framework differs from that
developed in [23], since we model the MCN as an input-
output system where the wireless networks transfer sensing
and actuation data between a plant and a controller (they are
relay networks), while in [23] the MCN is an autonomous
system where the wireless network itself acts as a controller.
Moreover, in our model we explicitly take into account the
effect of the scheduling ordering of the node transmissions
in the sensing and actuation data relay.
Our work differs from the existing literature since we
characterize the communication link failures detection prob-
lem in a MCN as a FDI problem, and state necessary and
sufficient conditions on the plant dynamics and on the com-
munication protocol. Moreover, we provide a methodology
to explicitly design the network topology, scheduling and
routing of a communication protocol in order to satisfy link
failure detection conditions of a MCN for any failure of
communication links. The explicit design of scheduling and
routing is a fundamental aspect of our contribution. In fact, as
evidenced in [13], when applying a wireless industrial control
protocol to the real scenario the topology of the wireless
network introduces hard limitations in the choice of the
scheduling. This is due to the fact that most of the wireless
industrial control protocols suggest that the communication
scheduling satisfies a specific ordering (see [13], [24] for
more details). The results in [12] and in this paper mitigate
these constraints, by proving that it is not required to perform
scheduling according to a specific ordering. This allows to
strongly reduce the scheduling length, as illustrated in [12].
II. MODELING OF MCNS
The challenges in modeling MCNs are best explained by
considering the recently developed wireless industrial con-
trol protocols, such as WirelessHART and ISA-100. These
standards require that designers of wireless control networks
define a communication scheduling for all communication
nodes of a wireless network. For each working frequency,
time is divided into slots of fixed duration ∆, and groups
of Π time slots are called frames of duration T = Π∆
(see Figure 2). For each frame, a communication scheduling
allows each node to transmit data only in a specified time
slot and frequency, i.e. a mixed TDMA and FDMA MAC
protocol is used. The communication scheduling is periodic
with period Π, i.e. it is repeated in all frames. The standard
T = DP
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Fig. 2. Time-slotted structure of frames.
specifies a syntax for defining scheduling and routing and a
mechanism to apply them, but the issue of designing them
remains a challenge for engineers and is currently done using
heuristic rules. To allow systematic methods for designing
the communication protocol configuration, a mathematical
model of the effect of scheduling and routing on the control
system is needed.
Definition 1: A SISO Multi-hop Control Network is a
tuple N = (P , GR, ηR, GO, ηO,∆) where:
• P = (AcP , B
c
P , C
c
P) models a plant dynamics in terms
of matrices of a continuous-time SISO LTI system.
• GR = (VR, ER,WR) is the controllability radio con-
nectivity acyclic graph, where the vertices correspond
to the nodes of the network, and an edge from v to
v′ means that v′ can receive messages transmitted by
v through the wireless communication link (v, v′). We
denote vc the special node of VR that corresponds to
the controller, and vu ∈ VR the special node that
corresponds to the actuator of the input u of P . The
weight function WR : ER → R+ associates to each
link a positive constant. The role of WR will be clear
in the following definition of ηR.
• ηR : N → 2ER is the controllability communication
scheduling function, that associates to each time slot
of each frame a set of edges of the controllability
radio connectivity graph. Since in this paper we only
consider a periodic scheduling that is repeated in all
frames, we define the controllability communication
scheduling function by ηR : {1, . . . ,Π} → 2ER . The
integer constant Π is the period of the controllability
communication scheduling. The semantics of ηR is that
(v, v′) ∈ η(h) if and only if at time slot h of each
frame the data content of the node v is transmitted to
the node v′, multiplied by the weight WR(v, v′). We
assume that each link can be scheduled only one time
for each frame. This does not lead to loss of generality,
since it is always possible to obtain an equivalent model
that satisfies this constraint by appropriately splitting the
nodes of the graph, as already illustrated in the memory
slot graph definition of [11].
• GO = (VO , EO,WO) is the observability radio connec-
tivity acyclic graph, and is defined similarly to GR. We
denote with vc the special node of VO that corresponds
to the controller, and vy ∈ VO the special node that
corresponds to the sensor of the output y of P .
• ηO : {1, . . . ,Π} → 2EO is the observability commu-
nication scheduling function, and is defined similarly
to ηR. We remark that Π is the same period as the
controllability scheduling period.
• ∆ is the time slot duration. As a consequence, T = Π∆
is the frame duration.
Definition 1 allows modeling communication protocols that
specify TDMA, FDMA and/or CDMA access to a shared
communication resource, for a set of communication nodes
interconnected by an arbitrary radio connectivity graph. In
particular, it allows modeling wireless multi-hop commu-
nication networks that implement protocols such as Wire-
lessHART and ISA-100. Our MCN model differs from the
framework developed in [11], since it allows modeling redun-
dancy in data communication sending control data through
multiple paths in the same frame and then merging these
components according to the weight function. This kind of
redundancy is called multi-path routing (or flooding, in the
communication scientific community), and aims at rendering
the MCN robust with respect to link failures and to mitigating
the effect of packet losses.
For any given radio connectivity graph that models the
communication range of each node, designing a scheduling
function induces a communication scheduling (namely the
time slot when each node is allowed to transmit) and a multi-
path routing (namely the set of paths that convey data from
the input to the output of the connectivity graph) of the
communication protocol. Since the scheduling function is
periodic the induced communication scheduling is periodic,
and the induced multi-path routing is static.
We define a connectivity property of the controllability
and observability graphs with respect to the corresponding
scheduling.
Definition 2: Given a controllability graph GR and
scheduling ηR, we define GR(ηR(h)) the sub-graph of GR
induced by keeping the edges scheduled in the time slot h.
We define GR(ηR) =
Π⋃
h=1
GR(ηR(h)) the sub-graph of GR
induced by keeping the union of edges scheduled during the
whole frame.
Definition 3: We say that a controllability graph GR is
jointly connected by a controllability scheduling ηR if and
only if there exists a path from the controller node vc to the
actuator node vu in GR(ηR).
The above definitions can be given similarly for observability
graph GO and scheduling ηO .
The dynamics of a MCN N can be modeled by the
interconnection of blocks as in Figure 1. The block PT is
characterized by the discrete-time state space representation
(AP , BP , CP) obtained by discretizing (AcP , BcP , CcP) with
sampling time T = Π∆. We assume that the plant P is
stabilizable and detectable, and that P = (AcP , BcP , CcP )
is the controllable and observable minimal representation.
If this assumption does not hold, then even with an ideal
interconnection between the controller and the plant it is
clearly not possible to stabilize the closed loop system, and
the control scheme in Figure 1 looses any interest.
The block GR models the dynamics introduced by the
data flow of the actuation data through the communication
network represented by GR according to the applied con-
trollability scheduling ηR. In order to define the dynamical
behavior of GR, we need to define the dynamics of the data
flow through the network, according to the scheduling ηR.
We associate to the controller node vc a real value µc(kT )
at time k, and we assume that vc is periodically updated
with a new control command at the beginning of each frame
and holds this value for the whole duration of the frame.
Formally, µc(kT ) = u(kT ).
The dynamics of the other nodes needs to be defined at
the level of time slots. We associate to each other node
vj ∈ VR \ {vc} a real value µi,j(h) at time slot h for
each node vi belonging to the set inc(vj) = {v ∈ VR :
(v, vj) ∈ ER} of edges incoming in vj .
When the link from vi to vj is not scheduled at time slot
h, the variable µi,j(h) is not updated. When the link from
vi to vj is scheduled at time slot h, the variable µi,j(h) is
updated with the sum of the variables associated to node vi
in the time slot h multiplied by the link weight WR(vi, vj).
Formally, for each vj ∈ VR \ {vc} and for each time slot
h ∈ {1, . . . ,Π}:
µi,j(h+ 1) =


µi,j(h) if (vi, vj) /∈ ηR(h),
WR(vi, vj) ·
∑
vk∈inc(vi)
µk,i(h)
if (vi, vj) ∈ ηR(h).
Finally, the actuator node vu periodically actuates a new
actuation command at the beginning of each frame on the
basis of its variables µi,u, and holds this value for the whole
duration of the frame. Formally,
u˜(kT ) =
∑
vi∈inc(vu)
µi,u(kT ).
The following proposition proved in [12] characterizes the
dynamics of GR at the level of frames, induced by the data
flow through the network at the level of time slots.
Proposition 1: [12] Given GR and ηR, the controllability
graph can be modeled as a discrete time SISO LTI system
with sampling time equal to the frame duration T = Π∆,
and characterized by the following transfer function:
GR(z) =
DR∑
d=1
γR(d)
zd
,
where DR ∈ N is the maximum delay introduced by GR,
and ∀d ∈ {1, . . . , DR − 1}, γR(d) ∈ R+0 , γR(DR) 6= 0.
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Fig. 3. Transfer function of the MCN interconnected system.
GO(z) can be computed similarly. The dynamics of a
MCN N can be modeled as in Figure 3, where each block is
a discrete time SISO LTI system with sampling time equal
to the frame duration, characterized by the transfer functions
GR(z), PT (z) and GO(z).
Let xO ∈ RnO , xP ∈ RnP and xR ∈ RnR be
respectively the states of the observability graph, of the
plant, and of the controllability graph. We will denote by
x =
[
x⊤O x
⊤
P x
⊤
R
]⊤
the extended state of N , with
x ∈ Rn, and n = nO + nP + nR. The dynamics of N can
also be described by the following state space representation:
x((k + 1)T ) = Ax(kT ) +Bu(kT ), y(kT ) = Cx(kT ),
u(kT ), y(kT ) ∈ R, (1)
with:
A =

 AO BOCP 0nO×nR0nP×nO AP BPCR
0nR×nO 0nR×nP AR

 ,
B =

 0nO×10nP×1
BR

 , C =

 C⊤O0nP×1
0nR×1


⊤
,
and
AR =

 0 γR(DR) γR(DR − 1) · · · γR(2)0(DR−2)×1 0(DR−2)×1 IDR−2
0 0 01×(DR−2)

 ,
BR =

 γR(1)01×(DR−2)
1

 , CR =
[
1
0(DR−1)×1
]⊤
.
The matrices (AO, BO, CO) are defined similarly.
III. FAULT DETECTION ON MCNS
In this section we provide a methodology to detect the
current dynamics of a MCN subject to link failures using
Fault Detection and Identification (FDI) methods. The failure
of a set of links f ⊆ ER ∪ EO on the dynamics (1) can be
modeled as follows:
x((k + 1)T ) = Ax(kT ) +Bu(kT ) + Lfmf (kT )
y(kT ) = Cx(kT ) (2)
where mf (kT ) : N→ Rn+1 is an arbitrary function of time
and Lf : Rn+1 → Rn is called the failure signature map
associated to the configuration of failures f . We define the
failure signature maps as in Figure 4:
where the d-th components δR,f(d) and δO,f(d) of the
row vectors δR,f =
[
δR,f(DR) · · · δR,f (1)
]
and
δO,f =
[
δO,f(DO) · · · δO,f (1)
]
are the pertur-
bations introduced by the configuration of failures f in
the paths of GR and GO characterized by delay d. Since
γR(d) ≥ 0 and γO(d) ≥ 0, and a failure of each path reduces
the value of the corresponding component, then δR,f (d) ≥ 0
and δO,f(d) ≥ 0 for each f ⊆ ER ∪ EO . In the absence of
failures L∅ = 0n×(n+1).
The signal mf (kT ) depends on the protocol applied
by the communication nodes when the configuration of
failures f occurs. By an appropriate choice of mf (kT ),
it is possible to model by (2) the dynamics of N when
a failure occurs in the set of links f , for any protocol
applied by the communication nodes in case of failure.
As an example, if a node sets to 0 the data contribution
incoming from a faulty link, then we can model this be-
havior by defining mf (kT ) =
[
x(kT )⊤ u(kT )⊤
]⊤
.
If a node uses the latest data received from a faulty
link, then we can model this behavior by defining
mf (kT ) =
[
x(kT )⊤ u(kT )⊤
]⊤
+ ν, with ν ∈ Rn+1
a constant vector of real numbers.
To perform failure detection of a MCN with the aim
of applying an appropriate control law for each dynamics
induced by all failure configurations, we first need to define
the set Φ ⊆ 2ER∪EO of failures we are interested in
distinguishing. In fact, we need to distinguish two failures
induced by sets of links f , f ′ only when they introduce
different perturbations of the dynamics (1), namely when
Lfmf(kT ) 6= Lf ′mf ′(kT ). For this reason, we define ΦΩ
the set of equivalence classes [f ], each consisting of sets
of links that affect the dynamics (1) by means of the same
representative failure signal Lfmf (kT ):
[f ] = {f ′ ⊆ ER ∪ EO : ∀k ≥ 0, Lf ′mf ′(kT ) = Lfmf (kT )} .
For simplicity of notation, we will denote in the following
the equivalence class [f ] by a representative set of links ϕ ∈
[f ]. In order to take into account simultaneous failures, we
define the subset ΦΣ ⊂ ΦΩ of equivalence classes such that
the perturbation introduced can be obtained as the sum of
Lf =


0 −δO,f 01×nP 01×nR
0(nO+nP−1)×1 0(nO+nP−1)×nO 0(nO+nP−1)×nP 0(nO+nP−1)×nR
0 01×nO 01×nP −δR,f
0(nR−1)×1 0(nR−1)×nO 0(nR−1)×nP 0(nR−1)×nR

 ,
Fig. 4. Matrix Lf .
perturbations introduced by equivalence classes of ΦΩ:
ΦΣ =
{
f ∈ ΦΩ :
(
∃ p ∈ N, ∃ f1, . . . , fp ∈ ΦΩ \ f :
Lfmf (kT ) =
m∑
i=1
Lfimfi(kT )
)}
.
Define the set of failures as Φ = ΦΩ \ ΦΣ. Φ always
contains the equivalence class ∅, that corresponds to the
absence of failures. It is easy to prove that the set Φ always
exists and is unique. For this reason, we can associate to any
given MCN N the corresponding unique set of failures Φ we
are interested in distinguishing, and model their simultaneous
occurrence as follows:
x((k + 1)T ) = Ax(kT ) + Bu(kT ) +
∑
ϕ∈Φ
Lϕmϕ(kT ),
y(kT ) = Cx(kT ). (3)
Given a MCN N and the corresponding faulty set Φ
modeled by (3), we address the problem of detecting a failure
ϕ ∈ Φ that is perturbing the dynamics of N by using the
measures of the signals u(·), y(·). To this aim we leverage on
the model-based approach developed in [18], which exploits
a bank of LTI observer-like systems (called the residual
generators) that take as input the signals u(·), y(·), and
provides asymptotic estimates of mϕ(kT ) for any failure
ϕ ∈ Φ. This allows to identify which failures are affecting
the dynamics of N . The problem of designing such residual
generators with arbitrary asymptotic convergence rate on
the model (3) is well known as the Extended Fundamental
Problem in Residual Generation (EFPRG). Necessary and
sufficient conditions for solving the EFPRG have been stated
in [18]:
Theorem 2: Given the failure model (3), the EFPRG has
a solution for the failure ϕ ∈ Φ if and only if:
S∗(L¯ϕ) ∩ Lϕ = 0, (4)
where L¯ϕ :=
∑
ϕ′∈Φ\ϕ Lϕ′ .
Given any L ⊆ Rn, the computation of S∗(L) can be
performed by applying the (C,A)-Invariant Subspace Algo-
rithm (CAISA) and the UnObservability Subspace Algorithm
(UOSA), recursive algorithms provided in [25]. We define
W∗(L) the fixed point of the following recursion (CAISA):
Wk+1(L) = L+A
(
Wk(L) ∩N (C)
)
, W0(L) = 0.
We define S∗(L) the fixed point of the following recursion
(UOSA):
Sk+1(L) =W
∗(L)+A−1
(
Sk(L)
)
∩N (C), S0(L) = R
n.
The following lemma provides a useful property of the
CAISA and UOSA Algorithms.
Lemma 3: Let L ⊆ N⊥(C), then W∗(L) = L,
and S∗(L) = L + K with K ⊆ N (C). Moreover, if
L =
(
N (C)
)⊥
, then S∗(L) = Rn.
Proof: Let L ⊆ (N (C))⊥, then
W1(L) = L+A
(
0 ∩ N (C)
)
= L+A(0) = L,
W2(L) = L+A
(
L ∩ N (C)
)
= L+A(0) = L =W∗(L).
For each k > 0,
Sk+1(L) = L+A
−1
(
Sk(L)
)
∩ N (C) = L+Kk,
with Kk ⊆ N (C). Moreover, if L =
(
N (C)
)⊥
, then:
S1(L) = L+A
−1(Rn) ∩ N (C) = L+ Rn ∩ N (C)
= L+N (C) =
(
N (C)
)⊥
+N (C) = Rn = S∗(L).
For the sake of clarity, we address the link failure detection
problem starting by two special cases. In the first case, we
consider a multi-hop interconnection between the controller
and the actuator and a single-hop interconnection between
the sensor and the controller, namely the controllability graph
GO consists of two nodes connected by one link. In the sec-
ond case, we consider a single-hop interconnection between
the controller and the actuator, namely the controllability
graph GR consists of two nodes connected by one link,
and a multi-hop interconnection between the sensor and
the controller. In the third case, we consider the general
case when both GR and GO are multi-hop communication
networks.
A. GR multi-hop and GO single-hop
If GO consists of a single-hop, then nO = 1, AO = 0,
BO = CO = 1. As illustrated in [18], each Lϕ can be as-
sumed monic with no loss of generality, since when failures
are not present the corresponding components ofmϕ(kT ) are
identically zero. For this reason, by an appropriate choice of
mϕ(kT ), we define the Lϕ in (3) as follows:
Lϕ =

 0(nO+nP)×nR−δϕ
0(nR−1)×nR

 ,
where δϕ ∈ (R+0 )nR is a row vector and Lϕ : RnR → Rn.
The following theorem states a negative result.
Theorem 4: Let a MCN N and the corresponding faulty
set Φ be given, where GR is multi-hop and GO is single-
hop. Then the EFPRG can be solved for each ϕ ∈ Φ if and
only if |Φ| ≤ 2.
Proof: (sufficiency) If |Φ| = 1 then Φ = {∅}, and
failures are not defined. If |Φ| = 2 then Φ = {∅, ϕ}.
Therefore, L¯ϕ = L∅ and L¯∅ = Lϕ. Since L∅ = 0, it is easy
to derive that S∗(Lϕ)∩L∅ = 0 and that S∗(L∅)∩Lϕ = 0.
(necessity) Assume that |Φ| > 2. Note that all the ele-
ments of the matrix Lϕ are zeros, except the (nO+nP+1)-th
row. For this reason:
∀ ϕ ∈ Φ, Lϕ = span[enO+nP+1] := LR.
Thus, for each ϕ ∈ Φ, L¯ϕ = LR. Since L¯ϕ ⊆ S∗(L¯ϕ), for
each ϕ ∈ Φ the following holds:
S∗
(
L¯ϕ
)
∩ Lϕ = S
∗(LR) ∩ LR = LR 6= 0.
The above theorem states that if the controllability graph
is multi-hop and the observability graph is single-hop, then
it is not possible to distinguish failures in a set Φ, unless Φ
is trivial. In the following section, we will show that more
can be done if the controllability graph is single-hop and the
observability graph is multi-hop.
B. GR single-hop and GO multi-hop
If GR consists of a single-hop, then nR = 1, AR =
0, BR = CR = 1. Using the same reasoning as in the
above section, we can define a set Φ of equivalence classes
of link failures that equally perturb the dynamics (3). Since
in this case the failures occur in the observability graph, by
an appropriate choice of mϕ(kT ) we define Lϕ : RnO →
R
n the failure signature map associated to the equivalence
classes ϕ ∈ Φ:
Lϕ =
[
−δϕ
0(n−1)×nO
]
, (5)
where δϕ ∈ (R+0 )nO is a row vector and each component
δϕ(d) is the perturbation introduced by a failure ϕ in the
paths of GO characterized by delay d. The following theorem
motivates an extension of the model (3).
Theorem 5: Let a MCN N and the corresponding faulty
set Φ be given, where GR is single-hop and GO is multi-
hop. Then the EFPRG can be solved for each ϕ ∈ Φ only if
the following condition holds:
d
((
N (C)
)⊥)
≥
∑
ϕ∈Φ
d(Lϕ) := nΦ.
Proof: Equation (5) implies that Lϕ ⊆
(
N (C)
)⊥ for
each ϕ ∈ Φ. Therefore
∑
ϕ∈Φ
Lϕ ⊆
(
N (C)
)⊥
, which implies
that:
d

∑
ϕ∈Φ
Lϕ

 ≤ d((N (C))⊥). (6)
Condition (4) implies that ∀ ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ Φ, Lϕ ∩ Lϕ′ = 0.
Therefore:
d

∑
ϕ∈Φ
Lϕ

 = ∑
ϕ∈Φ
d (Lϕ) . (7)
Applying (7) to (6) completes the proof.
The above theorem shows that it is not possible to design
a residual generator for each ϕ ∈ Φ if the rank of the matrix
C is smaller than nΦ. In particular, in system (1) the rank of
C is 1, and nΦ is equal to 1 only if the set Φ is trivial,
namely it contains the equivalence class ∅ and just one
equivalence class ϕ. For this reason, we need to consider
a more general model for the observability graph. More
precisely, we consider observability graphs characterized by
nS terminating nodes v1, . . . , vnS , with nS ≥ nΦ. This can
be modeled without loss of generality by redefining matrices
AO , BO and CO as in Figure 5:
where nO = DO + nS − 1 is the new dimension of the
state space. The failure signature maps Lϕ : RDO → Rn are:
Lϕ =


−δϕ,1
.
.
.
−δϕ,nS
0(n−nS)×DO

 , (8)
where δϕ,i ∈ (R+0 )DO and each component δϕ,i(d) is the
perturbation introduced by a failure ϕ in the paths of GO
terminating with node vi and characterized by delay d. The
following theorem states necessary and sufficient conditions
to solve the EFPRG when GO is multi-hop and GR is single-
hop.
Theorem 6: Let a MCN N and the corresponding faulty
set Φ be given, where GR is single-hop and GO is multi-hop
with nS ≥ nΦ terminating nodes. Then the EFPRG can be
solved for each ϕ ∈ Φ if and only if the following condition
holds:
d(LΦ) = nΦ, (9)
where the matrix LΦ :=
[
Lϕ1 Lϕ2 · · · Lϕ|Φ|
]
is the
juxtaposition of all failure signature maps in Φ and has
dimensions nS × nΦ.
Proof: We need to state the equivalence between (9) and
(4). For any ϕ ∈ Φ, Lϕ ⊆
(
N (C)
)⊥
and L¯ϕ ⊆
(
N (C)
)⊥
.
Thus, Lemma 3 implies that:
S∗
(
L¯ϕ
)
= L¯ϕ +Kϕ, Kϕ ⊆ N (C).
Moreover, for any ϕ ∈ Φ, Lϕ ∩ Kϕ = 0, thus:
S∗
(
L¯ϕ
)
∩ Lϕ =
(
L¯ϕ +Kϕ
)
∩ Lϕ = L¯ϕ ∩ Lϕ.
It follows that (4) is equivalent to the following:
L¯ϕ ∩ Lϕ = 0. (10)
Since nS ≥ nΦ by assumption, then d(LΦ) ≤ nΦ. Since Lϕ
are monic, Condition (10) implies that (4) holds if and only
if d(LΦ) = nΦ.
The following theorem characterizes the relation between
Condition (9) and the topology of GO(ηO).
Theorem 7: Let a MCN N and the corresponding faulty
set Φ be given, where GR is single-hop and GO is multi-hop
with nS terminating nodes. Then, d(LΦ) = nΦ if and only if
GO(ηO) is a tree, where vy is the root node and v1, . . . , vnS
are the leaves.
AO =


01×nS γ1(DO) γ1(DO − 1) · · · γ1(2)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
01×nS γnS (DO) γnS(DO − 1) · · · γnS (2)
0(DO−2)×nS 0(DO−2)×1 IDO−2
01×nS 0 01×(DO−2)

 , BO =
[
γ1(1) · · · γnS (1) 01×(DO−2) 1
]⊤
, CO =
[
InS 0nS×(DO−1)
]
.
Fig. 5. Matrices AO , BO and CO .
Proof: (sufficiency) Let GO(ηO) be a tree, where vy
is the root node and the terminating nodes v1, . . . , vnS are
the leaves. Therefore, for each terminating node vi, i ∈
{1, . . . , nS} there exist a unique a link ei = (v′i, vi) ∈ EO ,
with v′i ∈ VO \ {v1, . . . , vnS}. Define the configurations of
failures fi = {ei}, i ∈ {1, . . . , nS} and the corresponding
failure signature maps {Lf1 , . . . , LfnS }, each characterized
by nS rows and 1 column. Since GO(ηO) is a tree, for
each set f ∈ 2EO \
{
f1, . . . , fnS
}
, there exist p ≤ nS and
e1, . . . , ep such that Lfmf (kT ) =
∑p
i=1 Lfimfi(kT ), ∀k ≥
0. Since Lfi ∩Lfj 6= 0 for each i, j = 1, . . . , nS , i 6= j, then
Φ = {f1, . . . , fnS} and nΦ = nS . Since Lf1 , . . . , LfnS are
monic, then d(LΦ) = nΦ.
(necessity) Assume that GO(ηO) is not a tree.
Then there exist nodes v, v′, and v′′ such that
e′ = (v′, v), e′′ = (v′′, v) ∈ EO . Define f ′ = {e′} and
f ′′ = {e′′} In this case, Lf ′ assumes the following form:
Lf ′ = −


δ′vy,v1(DO) · · · δ
′
vy ,v1
(1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
δ′vy,vnS
(DO) · · · δ′vy,vnS (1)
0(n−nS)×1 · · · 0(n−nS)×1

 ,
where δ′vy,vi(d) is the contribution on the dynamics (3) of
all paths starting from vy , terminating in node vi, passing
through e′, and characterized by a delay d. It follows that:
Lf ′ ⊇ span




∑DO
d=1 δ
′
vy,v1
(d)
.
.
.∑DO
d=1 δ
′
vy,vnS
(d)
0(n−nS)×1




If a failure occurs in link e′, then the contribution∑DO
d=1 δ
′
vy,vi
(d) on the dynamics (3) can be decomposed as
the product of the contributions of all paths starting in vy and
terminating in v passing through e′, and of the contributions
of all paths starting in v and terminating in vi. Thus,
Lf ′ ⊇ span




(∑DO
d=1 δ
′
vy,v
(d)
) (∑DO
d=1 δv,v1(d)
)
.
.
.(∑DO
d=1 δ
′
vy,v
(d)
)(∑DO
d=1 δv,vnS (d)
)
0(n−nS)×1



 .
Since Lf ′′ can be defined similarly, then:
Lf ′′ ⊇ span




(∑DO
d=1 δ
′′
vy,v
(d)
)(∑DO
d=1 δv,v1(d)
)
.
.
.(∑DO
d=1 δ
′′
vy,v
(d)
)(∑DO
d=1 δv,vnS (d)
)
0(n−nS)×1



 .
It is clear that Lf ′ ∩ Lf ′′ 6= 0. If ∃k ≥ 0 : Lf ′mf ′(kT ) 6=
Lf ′′mf ′′(kT ), then the configurations of failures f ′ and
f ′′ belong to different equivalence classes of Φ and thus
d(LΦ) < nΦ. If Lf ′mf ′(kT ) = Lf ′′mf ′′(kT ), ∀k ≥ 0, then
the configurations of failures of f ′ and f ′′ belong to the same
equivalence class [Lf ′mf ′ ] of Φ, and we can not conclude
that d(LΦ) < nΦ. However, the simultaneous failure of links
e′ and e′′ belongs to the equivalence class [Lf ′∪f ′′mf ′∪f ′′ ],
with Lf ′∪f ′′ 6= Lf ′ and Lf ′∪f ′′ ∩ Lf ′ 6= 0, and thus
d(LΦ) < nΦ.
Corollary 8: Let a MCN N and the corresponding faulty
set Φ be given, where GR is single-hop and GO is multi-hop
with nS terminating nodes. If the EFPRG can be solved for
each ϕ ∈ Φ, then nS = nΦ and LΦ =
(
N (C)
)⊥
.
Proof: Straightforward since GO(ηO) is a tree, and thus
to each terminating node vi, i ∈ {1, . . . , nS} corresponds
only one path from vy to vi.
The necessary and sufficient condition given in Theorem
7 provides a hard constraint on the topology of GO(ηO)
induced by the scheduling ηO . This is not surprising, since
we require to solve the EFPRG for the set Φ of all con-
figurations of failures that perturb the dynamics (3). From
an implementation point of view, this constraint can be
both interpreted as hardware or software redundancy. In
the former case, the tree structure of GO(ηO) provides a
hardware separation for all paths from vy to the terminating
nodes. However, a tree communication graph might be not
always implementable in real cases: therefore, the constraint
on GO(ηO) can be implemented by using, for those com-
munication nodes that receive data from multiple incoming
links, separate memory slots for each of the incoming data.
These nodes will transmit distinct data for each memory
slot, thus providing a software separation for all paths from
vy to the terminating nodes. In general, a combination
of the above approaches is reasonably implementable in a
real communication network. An interesting future research
direction is relating the properties of GO(ηO) with Condition
(9) when the number of simultaneous failures that can occur
is bounded, or when failures can not occur in some secure
paths of the communication network.


01×nS−1 0 0 γ1(1)CPBP
2∑
i=1
γ1(i)CPA
2−i
P BP · · ·
DO−1∑
i=1
γ1(i)CPA
(DO−1−i)
P BP
DO∑
i=1
γ1(i)CPA
(DO−i)
P BP
DO∑
i=1
γ1(i)CPA
(DO+1−i)
P BP · · ·
0 0 γ2(1)CPBP
2∑
i=1
γ2(i)CPA
2−i
P BP · · ·
DO−1∑
i=1
γ2(i)CPA
(DO−1−i)
P BP
DO∑
i=1
γ2(i)CPA
(DO−i)
P BP
DO∑
i=1
γ2(i)CPA
(DO+1−i)
P BP · · ·
Ins−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. · · ·
0 0 γnS (1)CPBP
2∑
i=1
γnS (i)CPA
2−i
P BP · · ·
DO−1∑
i=1
γnS (i)CPA
(DO−1−i)
P BP
DO∑
i=1
γnS (i)CPA
(DO−i)
P BP
DO∑
i=1
γnS (i)CPA
(DO+1−i)
P BP · · ·
01×nS−1 0 0 0 0 · · · CPBP CPAPBP CPA2PBP · · ·
01×nS−1 0 0 0 0 · · · CPAPBP CPA2PBP CPA3PBP · · ·
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
01×nS−1 0 0 0 0 · · · CPADO−4P BP CPA
DO−3
P BP CPA
DO−2
P BP · · ·
01×nS−1 0 0 0 CPBP · · · CPADO−3P BP CPA
DO−2
P BP CPA
DO−1
P BP · · ·
01×nS−1 0 0 CPBP CPAPBP · · · CPADO−2P BP CPA
DO−1
P BP CPA
DO
P BP · · ·
01×nS−1 0 BP APBP A2PBP · · · A
DO−1
P BP A
DO
P BP A
DO+1
P BP · · ·
01×nS−1 1 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · ·
0nR−1×nS−1 0nR−1×1 0nR−1×1 0nR−1×1 0nR−1×1 · · · 0nR−1×1 0nR−1×1 0nR−1×1 · · ·


Fig. 6. Inductive definition of matrix Ψ∞.
C. GR and GO multi-hop
When both GR and GO are multi-hop, we need to define
the set Φ = ΦR ∪ ΦO of equivalence classes that equally
perturb the dynamics (3). In this case, failures occur in
both the controllability and observability graphs. Therefore,
by an appropriate choice of mϕ(kT ), we define the failure
signature maps associated to the equivalence classes ϕR ∈
ΦR and ϕO ∈ ΦO by:
LϕR =

 0(nO+nP)×nR−δϕR
0(nR−1)×nR

 , LϕO =
[
−δϕO
0(n−nS)×nO
]
,
with δϕR ∈ (R+0 )DR a row vector, and δϕO ∈ (R+0 )nS×DO
as defined in (8).
We recall that, for each ϕR ∈ ΦR non-empty,
LϕR = span(enO+nP+1). Therefore, we will consider
w.l.o.g. only one failure in the reachability graph, namely
ΦR = {∅, ϕR} with LϕR = span(enO+nP+1).
Moreover, by Theorem 7, a necessary condition to solve
the EFPRG for any ϕO ∈ ΦO is that GO is a tree. Therefore,
we will consider w.l.o.g. a failure in the observability graph
for each path, namely ΦO = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕnS} with Lϕi =
span(ei).
The following theorem states that it is not possible to
detect failures in the controllability and observability graphs
using the measurements of the observability graph.
Theorem 9: Let a MCN N and the corresponding faulty
set Φ be given, where GR is multi-hop and GO is multi-hop
with nS terminating nodes. Then the EFPRG is not solvable
for any ϕR ∈ ΦR and any ϕO ∈ ΦO.
Proof: We first show that S∗ (L¯ϕR) ∩ LϕR 6=
0. By Corollary 8,
∑
ϕO∈ΦO
LϕO =
(
N (C)
)⊥
, and
S∗(
∑
ϕO∈ΦO
LϕO ) = R
n by Lemma 3. Since L¯ϕR =∑
ϕO∈ΦO
LϕO , then S∗
(
L¯ϕR
)
∩ LϕR 6= 0.
To complete the proof, we need to show that for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , nS}, S∗
(
L¯ϕi
)
∩ Lϕi 6= 0, with ϕi ∈ ΦO. We
will only provide the proof for i = 1: the same reasoning
can be used for i ∈ {2, . . . , nS}.
The space W∗
(
L¯ϕ1
)
is generated by the submatrix Ψh,
which consists of the first h columns of the matrix Ψ∞ with
infinite columns inductively defined in Figure 6, and where
the value of h depends on the terminating condition of the
CAISA Algorithm. More precisely, h is the smallest integer
such that rank
(
span(Ψh)∩N (C)
)
= rank
(
span(Ψh+1)∩
N (C)
)
. The above terminating condition occurs at column
h if and only if one of the following two conditions holds:
(i) the 1-st row of column h (which is a scalar) is equal to
zero and column h is linearly dependent on all the previous
columns 1, . . . , h−1; (ii) the 1-st row of column h is different
from zero. We show in the following that condition (ii) will
always stop the CAISA algorithm before condition (i) can
occur.
Let m ∈ N ∪ {0} be the smallest value such that
CPA
m
PBP 6= 0. Since (AP , BP) is controllable and
(CP , AP) is observable, then m ≤ nP−1. Note that the first
ns+1 columns of Ψ∞ are already present, since they belong
to L¯ϕ1 . The subsequent m columns are linearly independent
from the previous columns since (AP , BP) is controllable
and m ≤ nP −1. Since the scalar CPAmPBP 6= 0 appears at
row nS+DO−1 and at column nS+2+m, the subsequent
DO − 2 columns are linearly independent from the previous
columns. Therefore, column h can be linearly dependent on
all the previous columns for h ≥ h1 = nS +m+DO + 1.
Let 1 ≤ d1 ≤ DO be the smallest value such that γ1(d1) 6=
0. Therefore, the 1-st row of Ψ∞ will have a non-zero value
for the first time at row column h2 = nS+m+d1+1. Since
h2 ≤ h1, then condition (ii) will always stop the CAISA
algorithm before condition (i) can occur. Therefore:
W∗
(
L¯ϕ1
)
= span

 InS−1 0 ψ10 0 ψ2
0 Il ψ3

 ,
where l ≤ n− nS , ψ1 is a nS − 1 column vector, ψ2 6= 0 is
a scalar, and ψ3 is a l column vector. Applying the UOSA
algorithm, we obtain:
S1
(
L¯ϕ1
)
=W∗
(
L¯ϕ1
)
+N (C) = Rn = S∗
(
L¯ϕ1
)
,
which clearly implies that S∗
(
L¯ϕ1
)
∩ Lϕ1 6= 0.
Theorem 9 states that, in order to detect failures in the
observability graph, the controllability graph must not be
subject to failures. By a practical point of view, the com-
munication protocol in the controllability graph is required
to implement failure detection using handshaking messages
between nodes and inform the controller about the set of
faulty links.
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